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LAW'S EXPRESSION: THE PROMISE
AND PERILS OF JUDICIAL OPINION
WRITING IN CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW©
By PAUL HORwITZ*
This article argues that there is a link between one's
theory of constitutional law, and one's judgments about
style in judicial opinion writing. It identifies several
special functions of the constitutional opinion,
including the democratic function of responding to the
counter-majoritarian difficulty through an act of public
justification, and the inter-generational function of
provoking a temporally extended dialogue about
constitutional values. Drawing on these functions, it
argues for an opinion writing style dubbed "open-
textured minimalism," that seeks to resolve cases
narrowly, articulate fundamental values and principles,
and spark long-term debates about the underlying
constitutional values supporting each decision. The
author argues that the Supreme Court of Canada's
rulings on section 2(b) and section 1 of the Chater
suffer from their length and technicality. The Court's
opinion in the Secession Reference on the other hand, is
held out as an excellent example of the open-textured
minimalist style favoured by the author.
Cet article propose qu'il existe un lien entre la
conceptualisation des notions constitutionnelles que
fait une personne, et leur opinion face au style utilis6
lors de l'6laboration d'une opinion judiciaire. L'article
identifie plusieurs fonctions sp6ciales attribudes
l'opinion constitutionnelle, y compris la fonction
ddmocratique d'6carter les obstacles contre-
majoritaires A t'aide d'un acte public de justification,
ainsi que la fonction d'enchainement successif que
provoque un dialogue en matiere de valeurs
constitutionnelles qui s'6tend temporellement. En se
basant sur ces fonctions, l'auteur encourage un style de
rddaction dit "open-textured minimalism," e'est-A-dire
un style qui cherche a resoudre des cas de fa.on 6troite,
tout en encourageant des d6bats A long terme quant
aux valeurs constitutionelles sous-jacentes sur
lesquelles chaque decision repose. L'auteur maintient
que les jugements de la Cour supreme du Canada
portant sur l'article premier et 'alin6a 2(b) de la Chate
sont longs et techniques. Toutefois, les conclusions de
la Cour dans le Renvoi sur la sicession constituent un
excellent exemple du "open-textured minimalism"
prdconis6 par l'auteur.
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Of course, the eternal effort of art, even the art of writing legal
decisions, is to omit all but the essentials...
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 1
I. INTRODUCTION: INTEGRATING THEORY AND PRACTICE
The division of legal scholarship into different fields or practices
sometimes leaves interesting gaps to be filled. Consider the unresolved
questions that lie at one intersection of scholarly legal interests. Legal
scholarship in recent years has seen the development of a field known
1 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (19 December 1915), in R.M.
Mennel & C.L. Compston eds., Holmes and Frankfurter. Their Correspondence, 1912-1934 (Hanover,
N.H.: University Press of New England [for] University of New Hampshire, 1996) at 40 [hereinafter
Holmes and Frankfurter].
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broadly as the "law and literature" movement. 2 That field consists of a
number of sub-categories. Students of "law in literature" examine the
treatment of legal themes in fiction. "Law as literature" scholars in turn
fall into two categories: those who use literary theory to confront general
problems of interpretation in the law,3 and those who study the literary
or rhetorical elements of legal writing.4
One gap created by this division lies between the two sub-
categories of law as literature. One group of scholars uses literary theory
to illuminate theoretical problems in legal interpretation. They argue
that something useful can be said about the nature of law and legal
interpretation if we employ literary tools such as hermeneutics.S Their
concerns with law as literature are theoretical, not stylistic. Other
scholars concentrate on the formal qualities of legal writing, while
acknowledging that their formal criticisms may ultimately depend on the
resolution of underlying theoretical issues. 6 Thus, the question of the
relationship between legal style and legal theory may be a neglected one.
Another gap is created by the way we discuss constitutional
theory. Constitutional scholars commonly concern themselves with the
abstractions of constitutional theory, or with the substantive results or
procedural norms that should apply in constitutional law. They have
much to say about the results that ought to be reached in a constitutional
dispute, or the method that should be applied, but they are less
concerned with the formal features of the judicial opinion that results
2 See, for example, L. Ledwon ed., Law and Literature: Text and Theory (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1996). Important works by individual authors include R.A. Posner, Law and Literature:
A Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988) [hereinafter Law and
Literature]; J.B. White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990) [hereinafter Justice as Translation]; J.B.White, Heracles' Bow:
Essays on the Rhetorics and Poetics of the Law (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985)
[hereinafter Heracles' Bow]; and R. Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies of Law and Literature
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).
3 See, for example, S. Levinson & S. Mailloux, eds., Interpreting Law and Literature: A
Hermeneutic Reader (Evanston, II.: Northwestern University Press, 1988).
4 For examples of scholars adopting this or similar taxonomies of law and literature, see, for
example, Law and Literature, supra note 2 at 5-6; R.A. Posner, Overcoming Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1995) at 472 [hereinafter Overcoming Law]; and P. Gewirtz, "Narrative
and Rhetoric in the Law" in P. Brooks & P. Gewirtz, eds., Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in
the Law (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1996) 2 at 3-4.
5 See "Preface" to Levinson & Mailloux, supra note 3 at ix. See also M. de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser,
"Lit. Theory' Put to the Test: A Comparative Literary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and
French Judicial Discourse" (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 689.
6 See, for example, D.R. Klinck, The Word of the Law (Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
1992) at 400 [hereinafter Word of Law].
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from this exercise. In short, they regard questions of style as foreign to
the concerns of constitutional theory.7
At the intersection of these scholarly interests, then, lies a
neglected question: should there be a deeper relation between one's
theory of constitutional law and one's judgments about style in judicial
opinion writing? This article is grounded on the proposition that certain
conclusions about the appropriate style of a constitutional opinion flow
from the theory of constitutional interpretation one adopts.
Two arguments, in particular, suggest this conclusion. First,
much of constitutional theory is concerned with whether courts may
legitimately issue judgments that thwart the will of the democratic
majority, in the name of the constitutional text. This is the classic
"counter-majoritarian difficulty." 8 For theorists who wish to preserve the
democratic legitimacy of judicial review, how the courts speak to the
democratic polity should be a natural concern.
Second, law relies on language as much as it relies on theory. To
be sure, constitutional theorists can derive principles from judicial
opinions without focusing on the specific language of an opinion. In fact,
constitutional theory routinely ignores the language of both judicial
opinions and the constitutional text, and seeks its own descriptions of the
underlying concepts of constitutional law.9 Ultimately, however, all that
we do in law must be communicated through language10 Though
abstract concepts may be drawn from the body of constitutional law, they
are inevitably incorporated in language. In an important sense, the
language of the law is the law.11 Constitutional theorists' ideas are
shaped and bounded by words. They may hope their ideas will find
7 This is not always so, as some of the sources discussed below indicate. See also K. Thomas,
"The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick" (1993) 79 Va. L. Rev. 1805
at 1811-12. Moreover, many constitutional theorists sometimes mention the stylistic aspects of a
given opinion, but those remarks are rarely linked back to the writer's larger theoretical concerns.
8 See especially A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics, 2ded. (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1986).
9 See, for example, R.A. Posner, "Judges' Writing Styles (And do they Matter?)" (1995) 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1421 at 1422-23 [hereinafter "Judges' Writing Styles"]. But see J.B. White, "The
Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life" in Ledwon, supra note 2 at 12: "It
is not the restatable message that is the most important meaning of the poem or the judicial
opinion, but the reader's experience of the life of the text itself."
10 See also J.G. Wetter, The Styles of Appellate Judicial Opinions: A Case Study in Comparative
Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1960) at 13: "Law's men act: words are media for their actions. Yet the
two-words and actions-form a whole, a fluid, expanding and contracting process."
11 See P.R. Hugg, "Judicial Style: An Exemplar" (1987) 33 Loy. L. Rev. 865 at 871.
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expression in the words written by judges, and ought to be concerned
with how ideas are expressed by courts. Style matters. 12
The concern of this article is the style of judicial opinion writing
in Canadian constitutional law-specifically, opinions interpreting the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]3 One of the most famous
apothegms in the American constitutional literature is Chief Justice
John Marshall's reminder that "we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding." 14 So, too, we might say of the Charter.
we must never forget that it is a new constitution we are expounding.
The Charter, after all, has existed for less than two decades.15 That fact
suggests much for the craft of judicial opinion writing in Charter cases.
I will argue that just as constitutions must be written so as to
allow them to survive and flourish over time, so too must judicial
opinions leave some room for the creative development of constitutional
doctrine over time. However, to some extent, the courts (particularly the
Supreme Court of Canada) have been intent on developing detailed
rules to govern future cases. Moreover, I will argue that, given the
important role the courts play in expressing the fundamental values
enshrined in the Charter, they are also obliged to seek a level of
eloquence and persuasiveness that might be less essential in other areas
of the law, but that they have fallen short of this goal.
I will advocate an approach to judicial opinion writing that we
might call "open-textured minimalism." Essentially, this approach urges
courts to answer constitutional questions narrowly, while opening
avenues for future discussion of the values implicated in a given case. It
aspires to more brevity and persuasiveness than is typically found in the
Canadian courts' existing constitutional jurisprudence. This approach
sacrifices some of the appellate courts' guidance function, but offers
greater room for a meaningful, time-extended dialogue about Charter
values.
Parts II and III lay some groundwork for this project by
considering the function of, and audience for, judicial opinions, and
discussing some common stylistic tools in judicial opinion writing. Part
12 But see T. Grey, "Holmes's Language of Judging-Some Philistine Remarks" (1996) 70 St.
John's L. Rev. 5.
13 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
14 M'Culloch v. State of Maryland et aL, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) at 407 [emphasis in original,
hereinafter M'Culloch].
15 By contrast, when McCulloch, ibid., was written, the United States Constitution was 30 years
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IV outlines the concept of open-textured minimalism. It also compares it
with recent arguments made by both Cass Sunstein, who has advocated a
kind of minimalism in American constitutional law,16 and Peter Hogg
and Allison Bushell, who have discussed the dialogic nature of Charter
review. Part V examines the virtues and flaws of current judicial writing
on the Charter by considering the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting
sections 1 and 2(b) of the Charter. Part VI offers some cautionary
remarks about the use of open-textured minimalism in judicial opinion
writing.
II. MATTERS OF OPINION
A. Functions of the Judicial Opinion
An analysis of judicial opinion writing cannot properly begin
without a more careful look at the function of the judicial opinion.
Despite the increasing importance of other sources of law, the "study of
law in Canada remains, to a large degree, the study of judicial
opinions."17 Yet we often examine judicial opinions-reading and
analyzing them-without probing their function and structure. The style
of judicial opinions is to the law as oxygen is to life: essential, but
generally unremarked upon.
Judicial opinions serve varied, sometimes conflicting, functions.
First, of course, they decide an issue in dispute between parties. It has
been suggested that the parties themselves might not care whether an
opinion is issued, so long as their claims are decided,l8 but that is not
quite right. Litigants-especially the losing party-want to feel they have
been treated fairly and justly.19 Thus, beginning with the parties
16 See C.R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) [hereinafter One Case]; C.R. Sunstein, Legal
Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) [hereinafter Legal
Reasoning]; and C.R. Sunstein, "The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided" (1996) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 [hereinafter "Leaving Things Undecided"].
17 M.E. Gold, "The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (1985) 7 Supreme Court L.R. 455 at 455. See also F. Schauer, "Opinions as Rules" (1995)
62 U. Chi. L Rev. 1455 at 1472 [hereinafter "Opinions as Rules"].
18 See J. Frank, Law and the Modem Mind rev. ed (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963) at
136.
19 See H. Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions (Carbondale, II.: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1992) at 28. But see K.N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding
Appeals (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960) at 289-90 (more important purpose is to inform winners
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themselves, the judicial opinion also seeks to justify the court's
decision.20
More generally, an opinion seeks to guarantee a measure of
consistency, stability, and predictability in the legal system. It does so
both to satisfy the litigants, and to ensure a measure of public confidence
in the integrity of the legal system: whatever their personal values and
motives, judges are required to provide a set of acceptable formal
reasons.
21
Another important function fulfilled by judicial opinions is
persuasion. It has often been noted that one of the opinion's chief
purposes is to convince readers that the result and the reasons used to
get there are just and fair.22 This is so for a number of reasons, including
the need to convince others to enforce the "violence" of a judgment,23
and the need to buttress the confidence of the participants in the legal
system that what they are doing is right.24 No doubt, judges also strive
for persuasive opinions to enhance their reputations at the bar and
increase their influence on fellow judges.25
Opinions offer another check of sorts on judges: the requirement
that a judge reflect on a case long enough to write an opinion, and the
knowledge that this work will be scrutinized by others, forces judges to
think carefully about their judgment, even in relatively routine or clear
cases.26 The written opinion thus serves as a safeguard against "[s]nap
judgments. ... casualness and carelessness in decision." 27 Moreover, the
which arguments succeeded). Moreover, the losing party needs some record of the decision to help
determine whether to appeal. See Bosmajian, ibid. at 28.
20 See also R. Martin, "Criticising the Judges" (1982) 28 McGill L.J. 1 at 5. One important
category of case in which the dispute resolution function does not figure, technically speaking, is the
reference opinion. While references are not formally adversarial, they do often attract opposing
groups of intervenors, preserving some semblance of the need for dispute resolution. The reference
more clearly fits the other functions of the judicial opinion discussed below.
21 See Bosmajian, supra note 19 at 27.
22 See, for example, Gold, supra note 17 at 455; W. Sadurski, "'It All Comes Out in the End':
Judicial Rhetorics and the Strategy of Reassurance" (1987) 7 Oxford J. Legal Studies 258 at 271.
23 See M.D. Daneker, "Moral Reasoning and the Quest for Legitimacy" (1993) 43 Am. U.L.
Rev. 49 at 50-51.
24 See L.H. LaRue, Constitutional Law as Fiction: Narrative in the Rhetoric of Authority
(University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) at 11.
25 See also Overcoming Law, supra note 4, c. 3; and H.T. Edwards, "A Judge's View on Justice,
Bureaucracy, and Legal Method" (1981) 80 Mich. L. Rev. 259 at 269.
26 See R.A. Leflar, "Honest Judicial Opinions" (1979) 74 Nw. U.L. Rev. 721 at 737.
27 R.A. Leflar, "Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions" (1961) 61 Colum. L. Rev.
810 at 810.
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requirement that a judge's intuitions and impressions be systematized
into language by being written down filters out muddy thinking.28
A function I have only touched on so far is the guidance
function. Courts do not communicate solely with the litigants before
them; they are also participants in a system of repeat players, including
lawyers and lower courts. Through their opinions, courts-especially
appellate courts29-help inform and supervise the other players in this
system. For high courts such as the Supreme Court, the guidance
function may be primary, while the dispute-resolution function is
secondary.30 In this way, opinion writing is a "conscious process of rule
making."31
B. The Democratic and Inter-Generational Functions
To these regularly invoked functions of the judicial opinion, I
would add two other functions, each related to the other. I call these the
democratic and the inter-generational functions. These functions
provide a link between ideas about constitutional theory and ideas about
writing style in constitutional law opinions.
The democratic function of the judicial opinion stems from the
judiciary's vexed position as an institution of government. On one hand,
judges are charged with the duty to interpret and apply the Charter.
Inevitably, judges will be required to make pronouncements describing,
and ultimately shaping, the values that lie at the heart of our political
and constitutional order. At the same time, they share this responsibility
with a host of other institutions. Hence, the counter-majoritarian
difficulty: the concern that courts, in applying the Charter, will block
more directly democratic institutions that attempt to shape our
constitutional values.
28 See "Judges' Writing Styles," supra note 9 at 1447. See also R.J. Traynor, "Some Open
'Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts" (1957) 24 U. Chi. L Rev. 211 at 218.
29 See LaRue, supra note 24 at 10.
30 See B. Wilson, "Decision-Making in the Supreme Court" (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227 at 234; and
B. Laskin, "The Role and Function of Final Appellate Courts: The Supreme Court of Canada"
(1975) 53 Can. Bar Rev. 469 at 475.
31 "Opinions as Rules," supra note 17 at 1470.
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The democratic function responds to this concern by requiring
judges to provide a public justification for their decisions. 32 This ensures
that courts retain some measure of democratic accountability: it permits
the public to monitor the courts' work, and reminds judges that they
must operate by more than mere judicial fiat. Thus, the democratic
function demands that judges speak to the citizens whose rights are at
stake, both to justify their actions and to attempt to persuade the people
that their conclusions are right. 33
Scholars such as Sunstein have argued that the courts should
sometimes fade into the background and allow greater deliberation and
conversation within the "democratic arenas" of society.34 Nevertheless,
the courts cannot evade entirely their law-declaring function, and may
have much of value to say about the fundamental rights they are charged
with interpreting. Moreover, even in a deliberative democracy which
values widespread societal dialogue, judges can encourage a dialogue
between citizens about constitutional matters. Their position makes
them particularly well-suited to contribute to any public dialogue on
constitutional values. Although the case-by-case nature of adjudication
restrains judges' perspective and renders their more general statements
less reliable, their experience at interpreting the Charter and their
relative isolation from political pressure makes them important
participants in any discussion of Charter values. Thus, the democratic
function of judicial opinions also recognizes the important role courts
play as educators about our constitutional values.35
The inter-generational function is similar. While the democratic
function stems from the people's present-day consent to be bound by the
32 See also A. Gutmann & D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (London: Belknap
Press of Harvard University, 1996) at 100: "[O]nly public justifications [by public officials] can
secure the consent of citizens, whether it be tacit or explicit. Such justifications help sustain a sense
of legitimacy that makes political cooperation possible in the face of continuing moral
disagreement."
33 For similar arguments in an American context based on the sovereignty of the people and
the courts' concomitant obligation to explain themselves in a way the people can understand, see J.
Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution: The Supreme Court's Obligation to Maintain the Constitution
as Something We the People Can Understand (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
34 See, for example, "Leaving Things Undecided," supra note 16 at 7,19.
35 See generally C. L'Heureux-Dub6, "The Length and Plurality of Supreme Court of Canada
Decisions" (1990) 28 Alta. L Rev. 581 at 582, 585; M. Tushnet, "Style and the Supreme Court's
Educational Role in Government" (1994) 11 Const. Comment. 215; C.L. Eisgruber, "Is the
Supreme Court an Educative Institution?" (1992) 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961; and E.V. Rostow, "The
Democratic Character of Judicial Review" (1952) 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193 at 208: "The Supreme Court
is, among other things, an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital
national seminar."
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Charter, and thus on the need for courts to address the people in their
constitutional opinions, the inter-generational function stems from the
long-term nature of constitutions. It recognizes that the breadth and
vagueness of constitutions, the difficulty of enacting or amending
them,36 and the temporally extended nature of the affairs they govern
makes it foolish to think of constitutions' legitimacy only in terms of the
consent of the present generation to be bound by them. Instead, it
recognizes that constitutions commit us to certain fundamental values
over an extended period of time, while accepting that our understanding
of a constitution and its underlying values may change over time.37
Though documents such as the Charter precommit us to certain general
governing values, such as ordered liberty and equality, they are not the
end, but the beginning of a temporally extended effort to understand
what these values mean and how they should govern us.
Given the youth of the Charter, we may not tend to focus much
on this aspect of constitutionalism in Canada. The Charter developed
from our pre-existing political values; it seems hard to envision that our
political values may eventually develop from the Charter. However, the
American experience should teach us that, over time, constitutions and
constitutional arguments truly constitute a people. They help to shape
and define us as a people by providing the framework and terms of
debate for our culture and our politics. Jed Rubenfeld puts the point
well:
Constitutional law does not live in the moment-not in any moment, past, present, or
hypothetical. It embodies a generation-spanning struggle-the historical struggle of a
nation to be its own author, to write its own codes, to lay down and to live up to its own
foundational commitments over time. Self-government takes time. A nation might take a
century to realize its commitment to, say, the freedom of speech or the equal protection
of the laws. It might take two centuries, or even more.38
Judicial opinions dealing with questions of constitutional law
must therefore, in a sense, speak across generations. They must attempt
to speak meaningfully to future generations of readers who will be
36 Including, as has been evident in this country, the quick development of reluctance on the
part of legislators to use the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter.
37 For recent discussions along these lines, see, for example, J. Rubenfeld, "The Moment and
the Millennium" (1998) 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1085 [hereinafter "The Moment and the
Millennium"]; M.C. Dorf, "A Nonoriginalist Perspective on the Lessons of History" (1996) 19 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 351 at 353; J. Rubenfeld, "Reading the Constitution as Spoken" (1995) 104 Yale
L.J. 1119; B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1991). See also C.
Fried, "Constitutional Doctrine" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1140 at 1144: "[W]c are time-extended,
not punctual, beings."
38 "The Moment and the Millennium," supra note 37 at 1111.
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bound by the same constitutional text, while leaving some room for
evolving interpretation of that text. This is not a terribly radical notion.
Given our respect for precedent, in a sense all appellate decisions "speak
from the present to the future,"39 since they provide guidance for future
conduct. Yet constitutional decisions differ from other kinds of
decisions. The common law may change-indeed, it is meant to change.
Though we occasionally refer to common law opinions dating from the
distant past, the common law is always in flux and the best authority is
always the most recent one. Similarly, statutes may be repealed,
overruled, or simply fall into obsolescence. In either case, court decisions
in these areas may only be of service in the short or medium term. By
contrast, the Charter remains a binding document and is meant to have
far greater permanence than other legal texts.40 It is thus particularly
important that judges writing opinions on the Charter recognize that they
are participating in a conversation 41 about our fundamental freedoms
with readers over an extended length of time, each of whom is caught
within his or her own era, but bound by the same "timeless" yet changing
document. 42
This discussion raises the question whether citizens at large
really form a part of the audience for judicial opinions.43 This question is
vital to our consideration of style because, if the judicial opinion is in
large measure an attempt to persuade, it is necessary to know who is to
be persuaded. Arguments will obviously be framed differently according
to the target audience. 44
In many non-constitutional cases, the primary audience may be
no larger than the litigants and their lawyers. Given the appellate courts'
law-declaring function, we can also assume that the community of lower
court judges, as well as other lawyers, government officials, and
39 See G.E. White, Patterns of American Legal Thought (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill,
1978) at 79 (quoting Henry M. Hart and John McNaughton).
40 See Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker [1984], 1 S.C.R. 357 at 366, per Estey J.: "The
Charter is designed and adopted to guide the Canadian community for a long time." [hereinafter
Skapinker].
41 See Justice as Translation, supra note 2 at 101: "[Wle can say that the legal text, like every
text, is a stage in a conversation and ask of it: Is this conversation one in which 'democracy begins?"'
42 See Heracles' Bow, supra note 2 at 88; Ackerman, supra note 37 at 23: "The challenge ... is
to locate ourselves in a conversation between generations."
43 See A.J. Mikva, "For Whom Judges Write" (1988) 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1357; R.A. Leflar,
Appellate Judicial Opinions (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1974) at 159.
44 See Bosmajian, supra note 19 at 31.
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academics, will often form part of the audience for an opinion. 45 As a
general rule, however, citizens outside of the legal community will rarely
form part of the "interpretive community" for judicial opinions. 46 Even
momentous cases, such as those arising under the Charter, are likely to
be encountered in media accounts rather than actually being read by
masses of citizens.47 The actual audience will still mostly be confined to
the legal and government community, along with a few reporters,
opinion-makers, and non-legal academics. 48
As a normative matter, however, if opinions also fulfil important
democratic and inter-generational functions, then they should attempt to
include the public as part of the intended audience, despite the low
actual readership in the larger community. Even if the actual readership
of Charter cases remains small, the legitimacy of the courts' power of
judicial review ultimately derives from the sovereignty of the people, and
from their consent to a system of judicial review that allows counter-
majoritarian rulings in the name of the Charter. The judicial system
ultimately exists "only for ... and because of' the people.49 Although the
people's consent to judicial review in our constitutional democracy can
generally be assumed, the fact of their ultimate ability to alter the
constitutional structure and curtail judicial review suggests that courts
should exercise their power of constitutional decisionmaking with at
least some regard for this ultimate source of judicial authority. This is
not to suggest that all constitutional opinions must be perfectly
intelligible to all potential readers, but courts ought to at least remember
that the public is an important potential audience for their opinions.50
Thus, when appellate courts draft opinions interpreting the
Charter, they ought to remember their duty to speak to the people, in
this and future generations. Recognition of the duty to speak to this
broader audience will have a considerable influence on the style of
45 See, for example, Grey, supra note 12 at 6. Robert Nagel suggests that the United States
Supreme Court's desire to achieve control and cohesion within the "official hicrarch[y]" of the legal
system has much to do with its adoption of the "bureaucratic style" which he criticizes. See R.F.
Nagel, "The Formulaic Constitution" (1985) 84 Mich. L Rev. 165 at 177-78.
4 6 Daneker, supra note 23 at 51.
47 See Tushnet, supra note 35 at 219.
48 See also P.M. Wald, "A Reply to Judge Posner" (1995) 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1451 at 1453.
49 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 35 at 582.
50 See also L.H. Bloom, Jr., "Barnette and Johnson: A Tale of Two Opinions" (1990) 75 Iowa
L. Rev. 417 at 428.
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opinion we should expect from the courts. 51 First, however, it would be
useful to subject the concept of "style" to a more searching analysis.
III. STYLE MATTERS
Despite occasional loose references to style as mere dressing or
ornamentation, there can be little real doubt that style is an essential
element of any successful judicial opinion, if for no other reason than we
cannot think or act without it. "Our language determines to a large
extent how we see reality, and tropes especially affect our perceptions
and how we see the 'truth." 52 Constitutional law, especially, is grounded
in abstract concepts and values, and thus inevitably requires the use of
metaphors, tropes, and other literary figures. Hence, we speak of
equality "before" or "under" the law, "chilling effects" on speech, or the
"marketplace of ideas." To a significant degree, we think in and through
style.
This article does not attempt a detailed taxonomy of the range of
possible styles observed in judicial opinion writing, but it may be helpful
to provide context through some general observations of the prevailing
styles of opinion writing.
Judge Richard Posner offers a useful classification of approaches
to judicial opinion writing, categorizing judicial styles as "pure or
"impure."53 Opinions in the pure style "have a lofty, formal, imperious
... "refined," ostentatiously "correct ... even hieratic tone ... ."54 They
are jargon-ridden and speak with certitude. They "tend to be long for
what they have to say, solemn, highly polished and artifactual ...
predictable in the sense of conforming closely to professional
expectations about the structure and style of a judicial opinion." 55
Impure style will "tend to be more direct, forthright ...
colloquial, informal, frank, even racy, even demotic."5 6 It will tend
toward brevity and lack of ornamentation, and will avoid headings and
subheadings, shunning "the 'professionalizing' devices of the purist
writer-the jargon, the solemnity ... the unembarrassed repetition of
51 See also Goldstein, supra note 33 at 128.
52 Bosmajian, supra note 19 at 17.
53 "Judges' Writing Styles," supra note 9 at 1421.
54 Ibid at 1426.
55 Ibid. at 1429.
56 Ibid. at 1426.
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obvious propositions, the long quotations from previous cases to
demonstrate fidelity to precedent ... ."57 It will show a fondness for wit
and a general conversational tone, in keeping with a view that it is
intended for an audience beyond the community of sophisticated legal
readers.
Wigmore offers a less thoughtful, but still useful, description of
common opinion styles.58 These include the "opinion by reference,"5 9
which relies on citations of earlier cases without much discussion of
reasons; the "factual opinion," 60 which concentrates on the facts to the
neglect of any useful statement of law; the "rambling opinion," 61 whose
lengthy and digressive nature offers little real guidance; and the
"cautious opinion," 62 which resolves the matter on fine points without
settling the main issues raised.
Critics of the recently prevalent 63 American style, offer a picture
of a style resembling that which is criticized with respect to the Supreme
Court of Canada below. 64 This style "emphasizes formalized doctrine
expressed in elaborately layered sets of 'tests' or 'prongs' or
'requirements' or 'standards' or 'hurdles.'65 They decry the U.S.
Supreme Court's jurisprudence as a "thick undergrowth of technicality
... with an almost medieval earnestness about classification and
categorization; with a theological attachment to the determinate power
of various 'levels of scrutiny'; [and] amazingly fine distinctions that
produce multiple opinions designated in parts, sub-parts, and sub-sub-
parts." 66 These tests-along with their close relative, the balancing
57Ibid. at 1430.
58 See J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, rev. ed. by P. Tillers, vol. 1 (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1983) at 614-18, 624-25.
59 bid. at 624.
60 Ibid at 625.
6 1 Ibid
621Ibid.
63 Though that style may be changing. See, for example, One Case, supra note 16.
64 For other criticisms of the Supreme Court of Canada's writing style, see Martin, supra note
20; and D.R. Klinck, "'Criticising the Judges': Some Preliminary Reflections on Style" (1986) 31
McGill LJ. 655 (discussing Martin, ibid.).
6 5 Nagel, supra note 45 at 165.
66 M.H. Horwitz, "The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism" (1993) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 30 at 98; see also B.
Marshall, "Foreword" in Goldstein, supra note 33 at xi-xii; and D.A. Farber, "Missing the 'Play of
Intelligence' (1994) 36 Wm. & Mary L Rev. 147.
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test-risk giving us the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, they
suggest we can reach decisions through the mechanical weighing of
"faotors";67 on the other, they constrain the actual act of balancing that
must occur, and obscure the judge's actual responsibility for the way the
balance is ultimately struck.68
Frederick Schauer offers an interesting qualified defense of this
oft-criticized style of opinion, one which advances the view that decisions
with multi-part tests and similar features constitute a useful attempt to
provide definitive guidance to lawyers and judges in future cases.69
Schauer acknowledges that many modem opinions of the United States
Supreme Court employ "quasi-statutory language," 70 but he asks
whether this is really such a bad thing. Formal elements are welcomed
when they appear in statutes. If judicial opinions are not so different in
purpose from statutes as legal academics commonly assume, then this
difference in treatment is unwarranted.71 Schauer suggests that we
dispense with our fixation with style and accessibility, since few people
actually read entire judicial opinions; even lawyers tend to consult them
only for useful sections and bits of language.Z2 Instead, we should think
of the judicial opinion as a "conscious process of rule making" that is
meant to fulfil a guidance function of "setting forth ... standards to help
those who are expected to follow the law." 73
Schauer's arguments reconfirm this article's thesis that one's
view of the importance of style is connected to one's theories about law,
particularly concerning the function of a judicial opinion. His arguments
are persuasive if one accepts that judicial opinions, like statutes,
primarily exist to provide guidance for lawyers and litigants, who want
certainty and not poetry. However, judicial opinions, particularly those
67 See, for example, C.E. Baker, "Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons
and Presses" [1994] Sup. Ct. Rev. 57 at 115.
68 See, for example, A.T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) at 148-49; F.N. Coffin, "Judicial Balancing: The
Protean Scales of Justice" (1988) 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 16 at 22.
69 See "Opinions as Rules," supra note 17 at 1472; F. Schauer, "Justice Stevens and the Size of
Constitutional Decisions" (1996) 27 Rutgers LJ. 543; F. Schauer, "Codifying the First Amendment:
New York v. Ferber" [1982] Sup. Ct. Rev. 285. See also F. Easterbrook, "Ways of Criticizing the
Court" (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802 at 808; R.F. Fallon, Jr., "The Supreme Court 1996
Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution" (1997) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54 at 57, 61.
70 "Opinions As Rules," supra note 17 at 1457; see also ibid. at 1459.
71 Ibid. at 1460-63.
72 Ibid at 1463-65, 1471-72.
73 Ibid at 1470, 1467.
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concerning constitutional law, serve functions other than the provision of
guidance. Judicial opinions that attempt to give definitive interpretations
of the meaning of a constitutional provision by laying down rigid quasi-
statutory, tests ignore the more far-reaching aspects of constitutional
adjudication. This is particularly true of the Charter, since courts are still
in the provisional stages of interpreting that document and may lack the
experience to lay down a workable set of quasi-statutory tests and
doctrines.
Schauer also gives short shrift to the persuasion function of
judicial opinions. Again, this is particularly important with respect to
constitutional adjudication. Unless the constitution is amended, or the
section 33 override is invoked to overcome judicial interpretations of
sections 2 or 7-15 of the Charter, or the courts revise their views in light
of a legislative sequel to their decision, 74 the final power to give
legislation the imprimatur of constitutionality remains in the Supreme
Court's hands.7S It may overrule itself, replacing one set of quasi-
statutory rules with another, but only at the cost of respect for the
Court's authority and legitimacy. Laying down statute-like tests in this
manner may thus provide clear guidance, but exacerbate the counter-
majoritarian difficulty.
This is where the democratic function of the judicial opinion
enters in. Constitutional judicial opinions must have some broadly
persuasive quality in order to retain any lasting authority. Though
Schauer argues that other branches of government make decisions
without public explanation, 76 the other branches of government must
subject their actions to deliberation in the legislature, and to public
debate during election campaigns. Judicial opinions must persuade, and
not just dictate, in large measure because of their isolation from this sort
of accountability. Schauer is right to note that not every member of the
public actually reads judicial opinions on the constitution or any other
subject, but neither does every citizen follow legislative proceedings or
political debate. Ultimately, judicial opinions must persuade not because
of the size of their readership, but because their legitimacy is always at
issue. So opinions must offer more than mere guidance. Thus, whatever
74 Canadian courts'may defer substantially to legislation that reflects a careful balancing of
competing interests, even if the legislative policy is at odds with and earlier judicial ruling. See R. v.
Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at 711: "Courts do not hold a monopoly on the protection and promotion
of rights and freedoms; Parliament also plays a role in this regard and is often able to act as a
significant ally for vulnerable groups."
75 But see generally Hogg and Bushell, infra note 140.
76 See "Opinions as Rules," supra note 17 at 1466.
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the merits of Schauer's arguments, other considerations counsel against
the proliferation of quasi-statutory language in judicial opinions, and in
favour of more open-textured language.77
Beyond observations about general categories of judicial style,
the discussion below may be aided by listing some particular tools of
legal writing. I discuss only two tools, albeit broadly conceived ones,
here. Both tools have a role to play among the general principles of style
that I propose for the writing of constitutional law opinions.78
One rhetorical tool commonly employed in fine judicial writing is
the trope-the figurative use of speech through metaphor, metonymy,
personification, and other figures. Metaphor, in particular, plays an
important role in the judicial opinion.79 Though Justice Reed urged that
a "rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech,"0 metaphors
are inescapable in law.8 1 As prosaic an area as antitrust doctrine, for
instance, renders abstract business activities more concrete through the
use of terms such as "bottleneck" or price "squeeze."8 2 In constitutional
law, David Cole has noted a "creative misreading" of First Amendment
metaphors by judges over time, in order to infuse old tropes with new
meanings, while still retaining the appearance of respect for the
authority of the past.83
This example suggests the strengths and dangers of tropes such
as the metaphor. On the one hand, they help make difficult and abstract
concepts easier to comprehend and work with. They can be powerful
persuasive tools, and revive old legal concepts through a fresh and
77 Schauer acknowledges, however, that different approaches may be required at different
times: ibid. at 1470.
78 For a fuller discussions of this topic see, for example, Bosmajian, supra note 19; and Leflar,
supra note 27.
79 See, for example, Bosmajian, supra; M. Boudin, "Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of
Metaphor" (1986) 75 Geo. L.J. 395; D. Cole, "Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First
Amendment Tradition" (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 857.
8 0 McCollum v. Board of Education, 68 S. Ct. 468 (1948) (per Reed J. dissenting).
81 See, for example, J.T. Noonan, Jr., "The Relation of Words to Power" (1996) 70 St. John's
L. Rev. 13 at 13: "Metaphor is unavoidable. The law is honeycombed with metaphor and we could
not live without it." See also G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980), for the broader argument that metaphor is inescapable and pervasive-not
just in language, but in all human conduct.
82 See Boudin, supra note 79 at 395.
83 See Cole, supra note 79 at 892.
20001
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
startling turn of phrase.84 Their allusive, evocative character helps us to
begin to shape a verbal response to new ideas that are not yet capable of
more precise understanding. Yet these qualities also arguably make
them dangerous. Metaphors "tend to run away with us. Then we find
that our thinking is directed not by the force of argument at hand, but at
the interest of the image in our mind."85 A metaphor such as the
"marketplace of ideas" image may obscure the degree to which reality
differs from the imagined image; we may forget to ask if there is a
marketplace of ideas, and if so why it ought to be left unregulated.8 6
Also, the meaning of a metaphor may be reinterpreted over time in
troubling ways.87 Perhaps if we stripped the creative imagery from a
legal concept, we could examine it more clearly.88
However, these dangers may be reconceived as potential
benefits. I have described an inter-generational function in
constitutional law that requires courts to attempt to guide future
generations while leaving them the space to reinterpret or reinvent
constitutional concepts and values over time. In that sense, the
possibility that a metaphor will be "misread" over time-that new
meanings will be poured into a capacious figure of speech-may be a
benefit, not a risk. Rather than view colourful phrases in a judicial
opinion through the lens of a fear of unintended consequences,89 we
might view them as sources of possibility and hope. Figures of speech
demand that readers fill them with meaning, and so offer an "almost
magical capacity to unleash creative thought,"90 while providing the
84 See D.S. Gordon, "'Jug Jug' to Dirty Ears": Maryland v. Craig Through a Literary Lens"
(1991) 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1404 at 1420.
85 Bosmajian, supra note 19 at 38, quoting Monroe Beardsley.
86 See, for example, J.A. Barron, "Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right"
(1967) 80 Harv. L, Rev. 1641.
87See Boudin, supra note 79 at 414.
88 Bosmajian, supra note 19 at 72, quoting Wendell Wilkie: "[A] good catchword ... can
obscure analytical thinking for fifty years."
89 See, for example, J.S. Kaye, "Judges as Wordsmiths" (1997) 69 N.Y. St. B.J. 10 at 10: "A
careless comma, a stray phrase, a fanciful footnote can come back to haunt in the cases and years
ahead."
9 0 Boudin, supra note 79 at 414.
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flexibility that future lawyers need to respond to changing situations.91
Tropes should be watched carefully, but used creatively.
Another useful stylistic tool is the aphorism or epigram. Holmes
is the acknowledged master of the epigrammatic moment, the
captivating phrase or sentence that convinces by sheer force of wit.92
Epigrams or aphorisms can easily be derided as containing more wit
than reason: Judge Pierre Leval is probably right to ask, "[D]oes anyone
who has studied law doubt that for every case in which impressive
rhetoric strengthens the opinion we can find a thousand where a self-
conscious literary device conceals shallow reasoning-where epigram
substitutes for analysis?" 93
Nevertheless, like metaphors, epigrams serve important
functions. Even dangerous epigrams-epigrams that capture our
attention too closely, that may be misinterpreted, or that may conceal
weaknesses in reasoning94-are full of potential. A vivid and memorable
statement encourages creative responses. It "rivets attention, crystallizes
relevant concerns and considerations, provokes thought."95 Consider the
decades of argument spawned by Holmes's championing of "the free
trade in ideas,"96 or the lasting influence of Lord Sankey's reference to
the Constitution as a "living tree."97 Moreover, as Mark Tushnet has
observed, memorable phrases offer "eruptions of individual idiosyncracy
in the otherwise bureaucratic operations of the Supreme Court,"
91 See Kaye, supra note 89 at 10 (noting that "a touch of ambiguity ... leaves room for the
unforeseen and unforeseeable."). For an interesting argument that "imprecision and uncertainty"
are valued commodities in the legal system, see P.A. Ritter, "The Packaging of Legal Information in
an Adversary System of Legal Decision-Making" (1980) 38 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 143 at 149.
92 See, for example, B. Kaplan, "Encounters With O.W. Holmes, Jr." (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev.
1828 at 1835. Holmes wrote, perhaps disingenuously, "I deny that I search for epigrams. I write too
rapidly to stop for phrases-and I certainly do not consciously skip over a difficulty.": Holmes and
Frankfurter, supra note 1 at 171.
93 P. Leval, "Judicial Opinions as Literature" in Brooks & Gewirtz, supra note 4 at 209.
94 See Kaplan, supra note 92 at 1835-36 (relating Morris Cohen's remark that "the trouble
with aphorisms and vatic pronouncements ... is that they lend themselves to being picked out by
different people to serve diverse unintended purposes").
95 See R.A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990) at 136 [hereinafter Cardozo].
96 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 630 (1919), per Holmes J., dissenting. For a recent
use of the metaphor in Canadian jurisprudence, see Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2
S.C.R. 217 at 256 [hereinafter Secession Reference]: "No one has a monopoly on truth, and our
system is predicated on the faith that in the marketplace of ideas, the best solutions to public
problems will rise to the top."
9 7 Edwards v. Canada (A.G.), [1930] A.C. 124 at 136, per Lord Sankey L.C.
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providing judicial sound-bites that may cut through the Court's typical
verbiage and possibly even reach an otherwise uninterested public, as
well as offering insights into the character of individual judges.98
Style is thus an essential element of judicial opinions. It
distinguishes short-lived opinions from those with a lasting influence,
both because a well-written opinion is more likely to be remembered
and quoted,99 and because open-ended or pregnant phrases, capable of
creative reinterpretation, allow subsequent courts to inject their own
sensibilities into the law while still giving a nod to precedent.
IV. OPEN-TEXTURED MINIMALISM
A. Toward a Standard of Opinion Writing
Style in Constitutional Law
Having noted the disparate strands of literary and legal theory
and practice, it is now possible to weave them together. A judicial
opinion should, before all else, seek a satisfactory resolution of the
dispute between the litigants. It must therefore offer a sufficiently clear
and definite account of the court's reasoning and the relevant legal
principles involved to reassure the parties that they have been dealt with
justly.0
At the same time, the opinion must also provide general
guidance for the other participants in the legal system, including lower
courts. On issues concerning the Charter, appellate courts should also
address themselves to their ultimate source of authority and
legitimacy-the community of citizens.10
The democratic function of judicial opinions also reminds us that
judges play an important part in an ongoing national dialogue about
fundamental constitutional values. The inter-generational function
reminds us that judicial opinions about the Charter must speak across an
unknowable number of years. Accordingly, the courts' style of speaking
about constitutional issues should attempt to reach citizens now and in
98 Tushnet, supra note 35 at 218, 222. But see R.A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and
Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) at 145 [hereinafter The Federal Courts].
99 See, for example, Boudin, supra note 79 at 404; Cardozo, supra note 95 at 136.
100 For the traditional view that that is all an opinion should do, see, for example, J.J. Parker,
"Improving Appellate Methods" 25 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 12 (1950); and H.B. Gregory, "Shorter Judicial
Opinions" (1948) 34 Va. L. Rev. 362 at 364.
101 See Goldstein, supra note 33 at 7.
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the future. At the same time, judicial opinions must leave room for
future courts to assert their own understanding of the Charter without
having to hack their way out of a thick tangle of precedents.
These arguments are underscored by one more factor: the
Charter is a relatively new document. Posner has noted that Chief Justice
John Marshall, whose early opinions interpreting the United States
Constitution still shape American constitutional law, cited few cases and
avoided jargon, freeing himself to write boldly and clearly. He could do
so because the Constitution was "still fresh," and he was unencumbered
by a "minefield of authoritative precedents." 02 Though the Supreme
Court of Canada has already written a great deal about the Charter, its
jurisprudence is relatively new and the years stretch ahead of it. There
ought to be no undue haste to spill ink on a clean page. The stewards of
this youthful Charter act in trust for future interpreters of the document,
and would be wise to offer doctrine sparingly.
B. Open-Textured Minimalism
With these requirements laid out, and keeping in mind the
discussion of style offered above, the Supreme Court might aspire to an
approach to opinion writing in constitutional law that I will call "open-
textured minimalism." 103 It should be emphasized that open-textured
minimalism is only a style. To be sure, it is also an expression of legal
theory, not merely a set of purely aesthetic suggestions. It cannot be
followed as if it were a rulebook; still, some general traits that would
characterize an open-textured minimalist opinion can be identified.
First and most obviously, an open-textured minimalist respects
the primary function of the judicial process: to decide cases. The judge
applies or develops as much doctrine as necessary to offer a resolution of
the dispute at issue. At the same time, the minimalist style demands that
102 Law and Literature, supra note 2 at 274; see also C.L. Eisgruber, "John Marshall's Judicial
Rhetoric" [1996] Sup. Ct. Rev. 439. But see C.F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and
the Rule of Law (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1996) at 181-91 (calling Marshall's
indifference to precedent a "myth," but noting that he placed principle before precedent, and
describing his methods of avoiding troublesome precedents).
103 1 share the use of the phrase "open-textured" with H.L.A. Hart, who discusses the "open
texture" of legal rules. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law," 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University.
Press, 1994) at 123, 127-28. Although the phrase connotes indeterminate language in both contexts,
I use the phrase for my own ends here.
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judges self-consciously avoid deciding more issues than necessary.1O4
Open-textured minimalist judges are also aware of their own limitations,
of the presence of substantial and reasonable disagreement regarding
the values underpinning the Charter, and of the potential costs of errors
if they seek to resolve a complicated issue definitively. 05 They therefore
seek to guard against too swift a development of constitutional doctrine.
These judges also remember the youthful status of the Charter, and their
own modest position in the context of an inter-generational conversation
about Charter values. They are reluctant to lay down too many rules or
settle too many questions at once.1 06
Accordingly, an open-textured minimalist court would, to the
extent possible, avoid the statute-like, multi-prong or multi-factor tests
that have characterized recent American constitutional opinions and
that, as we will see below, have also been prominent in Charter
jurisprudence. Though multi-prong tests leave later courts with
substantial discretion as to the results of particular cases, they pose
several difficulties. They can be difficult and laborious to apply. They
demand that future courts mechanically follow particular patterns of
analysis, and discourage courts from developing original approaches to
the law as their understanding of the Charter, or of relevant factual
circumstances, changes.10 7 Courts that wish to create new and possibly
better lines of doctrine must either abandon their old precedents, thus
showing disrespect for stare decisis, or pretend they are still following the
old precedents-a fiction which is quickly exposed and leads to even
greater disrespect for precedent. Furthermore, they encourage "tedious,
meandering opinions"10 8 that fail to capture the attention of the public.
104 This position has regularly been voiced by the Supreme Court of Canada. See, for
example, Skapinker, supra note 40 at 181: "The development of the Charter as it takes its place in
our constitutional law, must necessarily be a careful process. Where issues do not compel
commentary on these new Charter provisions, none should be undertaken."; Phillips v.Nova Scotia
(Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97; and Reference Re
Renumeration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 173-175,
per LaForest J., dissenting in part [hereinafter Provincial Judges'Reference].
105 See, for example, One Case, supra note 16 at ix, 4-5, 46-60 (describing minimalism as a
response to the presence of disagreement in a heterogeneous democratic society, and as a safeguard
against erroneous decisions on issues that are either politically controversial or factually
underdeveloped).
106 See E.E. Cheatham, "Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions" (1971)
25 Ark. L. Rev. 9 at 19: "Do not be too rigid. Leave room for wise choice and for new and
unforeseen kinds of cases."
107 See R.B. Ginsburg, "Speaking in a Judicial Voice" (1992) 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185 at 1198
("Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped ... may prove unstable").
108 "Judges' Writing Styles," supra note 9 at 1439.
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Minimalist judges therefore avoid the promulgation and proliferation of
tests, rules and standards.10 9
Instead, judges should self-consciously and actively participate in
a conversation about Charter values, offering persuasively argued
statements about the values relevant to a particular case, inviting a full
and open conversation among both the public and future courts. They
must not close off the possibility that our understanding of the Charter
and its values may change.
This may be accomplished in several ways. Judges should discuss
fundamental principles and values, but avoid enshrining these principles
in broad and binding rules of conduct. Instead, they should use dicta to
float ideas about the legal principles involved, inviting debate over these
ideas without attempting to resolve all of their implications. 110 In
addition, judges should seek to employ memorable but open-textured
language in discussing constitutional principles, offering phrases whose
meaning may be filled in, debated, and revised over time. The great
value of rich figures of speech such as "clear and present danger" is not
that they settled difficult issues (they did not), but that they offered their
contemporary audiences a reasonable explanation for the court's
judgment, while leaving future readers the opportunity for productive
debate about the values implicated by these pregnant phrases. Open-
textured phrases are useful place-holders for larger debates about
constitutional values. They are classically "Delphic" words, "profound
and obscure," which invite the larger interpretive community to fill them
with meaning.111 There is some risk that a court consciously seeking such
rich, open-textured language would fall into heavy-handedness or
pretension,112 but the benefit of seeing an increase in the amount of
eloquent and debate-provoking language is worth the risk of some
leaden prose.
109 Beyond the avoidance of expansive rules or standards, a minimalist judge may employ a
vast arsenal of avoidance techniques to avoid settling constitutional questions too hastily. Thus, the
"minimalist" aspect of open-textured minimalism is, in some respects, the offspring of a tradition of
constitutional law advocating the use of courts' discretionary powers to avoid resolving difficult
constitutional questions until they are truly ripe for decision. See generally Bickel, supra note 8; One
Case, supra note 16 at 4-6, n. 5., c. 1.
110 See also N.K. Katyal, "Judges as Advicegivers" (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1709 (building on
Bickel and Sunstein, and arguing that judges should employ "advicegiving" dicta to recommend
certain courses of action without requiring it). This approach, Katyal notes (in tune with my own
concerns), "mediatefs] the tensions in a system of law based on stare decisis": ibid. at 1714.
111 See LaRue, supra note 24 at 84.
112 See S. Petch, "Borderline Judgments: Law or Literature?" (1991) 7 Austr. J.L. & Soc'y 3 at
9. See also Kaye, supra note 89 at 11.
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Open-textured minimalism, as defined here, is not a synonym for
judicial conservatism, nor an antonym for judicial activism. Minimalism
alone risks lapsing into judicial passivity or quiet support of the status
quo because it encourages judges to leave difficult issues unresolved.
However, these fears should be allayed when minimalism is paired with
the provocative, debate-encouraging language that is part of the open-
textured minimalist style. An open-textured minimalist may write an
epigrammatic opinion whose implications, though perhaps not spelled
out in a broad rule, ultimately prove far-reaching. Open-textured
minimalism does not require that a judicial opinion do nothing at all.
Rather, it is an approach that attempts to decide questions narrowly,
without laying down too much doctrine, while still providing suggestive
and evocative prose that will be the starting point for ongoing
conversations about Charter values. In a landscape of moral and political
heterogeneity and factual uncertainty, open-textured minimalism can
become an effective and appropriate method of balancing the risks of
judicial activism against the risks of judicial quietism.
Some other general traits also characterize the opinion of an
open-textured minimalist.113 Conscious of their duty to reach the larger
public audience for constitutional law opinions, open-textured
minimalists strive for brevity in their opinions. They avoid "long-winded
developments of the obvious" 114-the lengthy discussions of irrelevant
facts and pointless recounting of cases that have long fallen into
desuetude, typical of what Wigmore called the "rambling opinion."1 15 To
encourage contemporary and inter-generational dialogue, they offer an
honest account of the arguments against their position. For the sake of
the educative and democratic functions, they also seek the memorable
aphorism, the striking or pregnant phrase that often becomes the sound-
bite of an opinion and captures the attention of a wider audience.1 16
This is simply a general sketch of the approach of the open-
textured minimalist. Rough as it is, it offers itself up to the criticism that
the judge it describes is something of a coward or laggard, who refuses to
provide guidance to lower courts and instead dashes off a series of
113 The principles in this paragraph derive in part from Goldstein, supra note 33 at 112-16; R.
Forrester, "Truth in Judging: Supreme Court Opinions As Legislative Drafting" (1985) 38 Vand. L.
Rev. 463 at 469-72; and Hugg, supra note 11 at 868-69.
114 See Holmes and Frankfurter, supra note 1 at 186.
115 See Farber, supra note 66 at 154.
116 See Tushnet, supra note 35.
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obscure judicial poems or koans.117 I do not mean to advocate a kind of
judicial mysticism, or a focus on judicial aesthetics to the exclusion of
sound reasoning. To take Holmes or Denning as exemplars, it should be
clear that it is possible to write with clarity and perceptiveness about
difficult legal issues while still maintaining a succinct and evocative style
and leaving room for future doctrinal development. The open-textured
minimalist recognizes that there is some wisdom in not laying down too
much law at once,118 and an equal measure of wisdom in encouraging
future conversations about constitutional and Charter values. The open-
textured minimalist takes courage from these words describing Judge
Learned Hand:
[I]t is not surprising that on occasion we find in Learned Hand, as in Holmes, a certain
vagueness of formulation and a penumbral scope to decisions. This is a manifestation of
clarity of thought. It is the kind of clarity which, in Professor Whitehead's phrase, "leaves
the darkness unobscured." Analysis of a difficult problem may still be incomplete or its
solution as yet unattained. The search for truth at a given time may require even of a
judge avowed agnosticism or inexplicitness of statement.... Learned Hand knows what
he does not know; and he knows the importance of not obstructing deeper analysis
tomorrow by the illusory certainty of obsolete or premature generalization.119
C. Sunstein's Minimalism
At this point, I want to contrast the vision of open-textured
minimalism offered above with another set of arguments for a kind of
judicial minimalism that have been proposed in recent works by Cass
Sunstein. Sunstein's theory of minimalism shares a number of basic traits
with the vision of open-textured minimalism offered in this article, but
the ways in which our visions of minimalism differ reinforce this article's
suggestion that one's theory of constitutional law and one's beliefs about
style are ultimately interconnected.
Sunstein sets out both a general theory and a specific application
of his theory to constitutional adjudication. He argues that the
enterprise of law is possible in our divided and heterogeneous society
because judges rely on "incompletely theorized agreements"-
agreements to settle those aspects of a case or legal issue on which there
1 1 7 See Cardozo, supra note 95 at 134.
118 See Fallon, supra note 69 at 113-14: "The task of crafting a new rule or test--or even a
serious proposal for one-is hard work, requiring resources that may not always lie at hand. And a
failed effort can be costly. Sometimes in constitutional law, as in medicine, the governing principle
should be: 'First, do no harm."'
119 F. Frankfurter, "Judge Learned Hand," (1947) 60 Harv. L. Rev. 325 at 326-27.
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is consensus, while leaving other questions undecided or unreasoned. 120
The courts' use of incompletely theorized agreements will be helped
along by "constructive uses of silence"; that is, courts will avoid
addressing issues that may prove "false, obtuse, or excessively
contentious." 121
Sunstein's ultimate aim is to provide a defense of a minimalist
approach to judicial reasoning, favouring case-by-case judgments over
the development of broadly binding rules.122 This approach does more
than make legal agreement possible in a system rife with disagreement
about social values, it also serves Sunstein's broader interest in
deliberative democracy-his belief that citizens in a democratic republic
should enter into meaningful dialogues about their fundamental values.
Though he recognizes that courts on occasion provide important
statements of principle, he largely rejects the view that a court should be
seen as a "forum of principle."123 Instead, courts should have a "limited
place ... in a democratic society, where fundamental principles are best
discussed and announced in democratic arenas." 124
More recently, Sunstein has focused on the practice of
constitutional law. His minimalist judges-who, he suggests, include a
majority of the current United States Supreme Court-"decide no more
than they have to decide. They leave things open. They make
deliberative decisions about what should be left unsaid. This practice is
pervasive: doing and saying as little as necessary to justify an
outcome."125 These judges, utilizing incompletely theorized agreements
and relying on the constructive uses of silence, are "decisional
minimalists." They avoid "broad rules and abstract theories," preferring
to limit their role to deciding cases, rather than attempting to resolve
broader social controversies. They rely on analogy and fact-specific
reasoning instead of grand theories.126
Sunstein argues that "[o]ne of the major advantages of
minimalism is that it grants a certain latitude to other branches of
government by allowing the democratic process to adapt to future
developments, to produce mutually advantageous compromises, and to
1 2 0 See Legal Reasoning, supra note 16 at 35-38.
121 ]bid. at 38-39.
122 Ibid. at 101.
123 Ibid. at xiii-ix.
12 4 Ibid. at 6.
125 "Leaving Things Undecided," supra note 16 at 6.
126 Ibid. at 7, 14, 20.
Law's Expression
add new information and perspectives to legal problems." 127 He
acknowledges that a strong judicial hand may sometimes be necessary to
strengthen deliberative democracy, as when it defends prerequisites to
public deliberation such as the First Amendment, 128 but on the whole,
his approach favours deciding constitutional cases narrowly and giving
the democratic process greater breathing room.
The common point of departure between Sunstein's vision of
minimalism and mine is the role we envision for courts in the system of
democratic deliberation. Sunstein shies away from the important role
courts must play in enunciating fundamental constitutional values--even
controversial ones-because his interest is in pushing discussion of issues
of public controversy to democratic arenas.129 He places much emphasis
on the courts' use of silence. However, judges are, after all, charged with
the function of declaring and clarifying those values every time they
engage in judicial review. That institutional role makes them uniquely
qualified to catalyze debate about constitutional values, and provide
important contributions to that debate, even if the debate is ultimately
resolved by democratic deliberation and not by judicial fiat.130 Open-
textured minimalism urges judges to at least open a dialogue about
constitutional questions, and advocates a different approach to
incompletely theorized agreement: decide cases on the basis of facts and
low-level principles, while deliberately seeking to spark dialogue among
courts and citizens about the nature of the high-level principles involved.
Put in Sunstein's terms, open-textured minimalism seeks
decisions that are "deeply reasoned but also narrow." 131 Deep but
narrow decisions do not lay down new, overarching tests or standards,
but "venture ... ambitious remarks" about the general constitutional
127Ibid. at 19.
128 See, for example, ibid at 29, 37; One Case, supra note 16 at 64.
129 "In American government and in all well-functioning democracies, the real forum of high
principle is politics, not the judiciary....": Legal Reasoning, supra note 16 at 7.
13 0 See B. Friedman, "Dialogue and Judicial Review" (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 at 583, 669:
"[Clourts interpret the Constitution, but they also facilitate and mold a society wide constitutional
dialogue."; "[C]ourt decisions may act as a catalyst, causing society to debate issues that might not
otherwise have stood at the top of the agenda." Judges acting in this fashion may, in fact, influence
democratic deliberation, without foreclosing it, by serving as what Sunstein elsewhere calls "norm
entrepreneurs," whose support for new ideas may reveal weak support for existing legal or social
norms and make it less costly for individuals to support new ideas. See, for example, C.R. Sunstein,
"Social Norms and Social Roles" (1996) 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903 at 929.
131 See"Leaving Things Undecided," supra note 16 at 24.
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principles implicated by the case. 132 To be sure, Sunstein supports deep
but narrow decisions in some instances,133 but his general aim is to limit
the "width and depth of judicial judgments."134 There we disagree.
Thus, our differences with respect to the role of judges lead us to
different visions of minimalism, and hence to different conclusions about
the desirable style of judicial opinion writing in constitutional cases. We
may share the view that the Supreme Court's opinion in Romer v.
Evans135 was "an extraordinary and salutary moment in American
law,"136 but the open-textured minimalist is as interested in the potential
for future development left open by the richly evocative and suggestive
language of Justice Kennedy's opinion as he is in the fact that Romer
elided controversy by leaving "many issues open."13 7
In short, Sunstein's model of minimalism urges upon the courts a
constructive silence, whereas the open-textured minimalist is less
interested in the use of silence than in using judicial language to open up
avenues for meaningful discussion and deliberation about our
constitutional values. Those avenues may sometimes be opened by
silence, as when a refusal to finally resolve by constitutional means the
issue of assisted suicide sparks debate on the issue in the media and in
legislatures.138 Often, however, the minimalist judge will provoke
dialogue through the pregnant phrase, the artful argument that initiates
and provokes a valuable and wide-ranging conversation about rights and
their limits. 139
132 Ibi. at 25.
133 1bi. at 74-77.
134 Ibid. at 99 [emphasis added].
135 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) [hereinafter Romer], holding that a state constitutional amendment
forbidding the enactment or enforcement of anti-discrimination laws involving gays, lesbians, or
bisexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
136 "Leaving Things Undecided," supra note 16 at 9.
1371bid.
138 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (holding that laws prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide did not violate constitutional guarantees of due process or equal
protection, and permitting debate on the issue "to continue, as it should in a democratic society":
ibid. at 2275); and Rodtiquezv. British Columbia, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (holding that the prohibition of
physician-assisted suicide did not offend principles of fundamental justice, and noting both the lack
of clear social consensus on the issue and the value of deferring to the legislature for the
development of gradually evolved procedural controls).
139 See M.C. Doff, "The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation" (1998) 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 79: "Especially in an age when the judiciary is painfully
aware of its own limitations, the articulation of fundamental (albeit corrigible) values may be its
central task."
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D. Hogg & Bushell's Dialogue
A recent article by Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell also deserves
a brief discussion, despite its somewhat different focus.140 Their project
is to defend the courts against the counter-majoritarian difficulty that
arises when judges invoke the Charter to strike down the laws of duly
elected legislatures. They do so by proposing that we treat judicial review
as "part of a 'dialogue' between the judges and the legislatures." 141
Though the Supreme Court might seem to have the final say on the
interpretation of the Charter, "[w]here a judicial decision striking down a
law on Charter grounds can be reversed, modified, or avoided by a new
law, any concern about the legitimacy of judicial review is greatly
diminished."142 As their survey suggests, the legislatures have regularly
responded to court decisions by amending a law or crafting alternative
legislation to get around the courts' rulings. The Supreme Court often
aids in this process, by suggesting legislative approaches that would pass
constitutional muster.1 43 This view of the interplay between courts and
legislatures has proven attractive to the Supreme Court in its rulings on
politically sensitive or controversial issues.1 44
The dialogue metaphor highlights this article's argument that
legal theory and legal style are intimately connected. Judges who are
confident their understanding of the Charter is absolute, correct and
final, and that judicial review exists to correct legislative mistakes and
not to engage in dialogue, may write in a style that reflects this view:
140 See P.W. Hogg & A.A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures
(Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J.
75.
141 Ibid. at 79. For more detailed discussions of the dialogic nature of judicial review, and the
courts' relationship with legislatures and the public, see, for example, B. Slattery, "A Theory of the
Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 701; J. Jai, "Policy, Politics and Law: Changing Relationships
in Light of the Charter" (1997) 9 N.J.C.L. 1; N. Devins, Shaping Constitutional Values: Elected
Government, The Supreme Court, and the Abortion Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996);
W.N. Eskridge, Jr. and P.P. Frickey, "The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium" (1994) 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26; and Friedman, supra note 130.
142 Hogg & Bushell, supra note 140 at 80.
143 For recent Canadian Supreme Court of Canada decisions offering detailed or specific
suggestions to bring legislation in line with the Constitution see, for example, Libman v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 [hereinafter Libman]; and Provincial Judges' Reference, supra
note 104.
144 The Hogg and Bushell thesis is relied upon in the majority judgements in Vriend v. Alberta
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at 564-66, 578; M. v. H. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. at 59-60; and Mills, supra note 74 at
711.
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peremptory, blunt, self-assured, possibly dogmatic or pompous. Judges
with a more tentative view of the role of judicial review and a more
respectful view of the legislature may write in another style: conciliatory,
careful, hesitant, ringed round with caveats and non-binding suggestions.
Judges who view themselves as part of an intertemporal dialogue with
future generations of citizens and courts, as well as a contemporary
dialogue with the legislature, may write in their own distinct style as they
attempt to persuade and inspire a broad range of unknowable readers.
This leads to a question left open by Hogg and Bushell's vision of
dialogue: what should the scope and nature of that dialogue be? If the
courts are truly to escape the spectre of counter-majoritarianism, must
they not also participate in a broader societal dialogue? Hogg and
Bushell argue that further evidence of the dialogue between courts and
legislatures can be found in the increasing "Charter-speak" of
legislatures-that is, their increasing tendency to respond to judicial
decisions with legislation that specifically addresses itself to the dictates
of the Charter, with references to pressing and substantial purposes or
reasonable limits.1 45 Their point could be expanded to encourage a more
meaningful form of Charter-speak, in which citizens and their legislators,
sparked by the open-textured and provocative language of the courts,
debate the meaning of the Charter, not just its technical requirements.
More generally, if the courts and legislatures are in fact engaged
in a kind of dialogue on the Charter, what are the acceptable terms of
this dialogue? This question applies to both courts and legislatures. For
example, in the course of rendering its judgments, the Court often
suggests an alternative legislation provision that might pass muster. In
Libman, for example, the Supreme Court struck down a nearly complete
ban on independent spending in referendum campaigns, while
suggesting a $1,000 limit might be acceptable. To what degree can the
Court's suggested alternative be taken as mere dicta?146 If the court
holds that a law that infringes the Charter has been given inadequate
justification, is it appropriate for a legislature simply to pass a more or
less identical law that makes reference to legislative findings, combined
with preambular phrases such as "pressing and substantial"? Or must it
actively and independently reconsider whether the earlier law was
justifiable in light of the Charter values propounded by the court?
145 See Hogg & Bushell, supra note 140 at 101-04; see also Jai, supra note 141 at 11.
146 See Libman, supra note 143 at 616-620. See also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 141 at 39-
42 (discussing the courts' use of dicta as a signalling device to other institutional actors, including
lower courts and legislatures).
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Clearly, a number of factors might determine the answers to
these questions. We would have to consider, among other things, the
institutional competence of the courts to suggest alternative legislative
schemes, and whether their sometimes detailed suggestions can
legitimately said to be required by the bare language of the Charter.1 47
We would also have to consider whether the Charter requires legislatures
to engage in a more searching deliberation about the values inherent in
the Charter before passing laws that may infringe it, or whether they can
simply insert Charter-speak mechanically into legislative language as a
substitute for deeper reflection on the proper limits of the law. Finally,
as my discussion of the democratic and inter-generational functions of
the judicial opinion suggests, we would have to consider whether a
broader dialogue should not be encouraged by the language of the
courts.
These speculations suggest a good deal remains to be said about
how the dialogue should be conducted, and with whom. Open-textured
minimalism offers one model for this dialogue.
V. STYLE IN CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
OPINION WRITING: A CASE STUDY
In this section, I will examine a number of cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada over the past decade that deal with the
guarantee of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. By
examining the opinions on a particular subject rather than a mix of
constitutional cases, we can see how the Court's approach to opinion
writing has changed over time. Moreover, section 2(b)'s status as a
broadly worded fundamental right makes it a provision that lends itself
to eloquence and expansiveness in judicial writing. If open-textured
minimalism is to be found anywhere in the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence, it ought to be found here.
There are two halves to the tale of the Court's style in its section
2(b) jurisprudence. First, consider the question of minimalism. Within a
few years of the Charter's inception, the Court issued multi-part and
147 Thus, in Mills, supra note 74, the Supreme Court held that Bill C-46 (dealing with the
disclosure of private, psychiatric records of sexual assault complainants) was constitutional despite
its failure to track exactly the common law disclosure procedure set out by the Court in R. v.
O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. The Court noted that "[w]hile it is the role of the courts to specify
[constitutional] standards," Parliament could choose from "a range of permissible regimes that can
meet those standards." Mills, ibid. at 712. Thus, "the mere fact that Bill C-46 does not mirror
O'Connor [did] not render it unconstitutional." 1bid at 745.
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structured, if open-ended, tests to be applied in considering a law's
constitutionality. The most prominent example is surely the "Oakes
test," which sets out the factors to be considered in evaluating whether
an infringement of the Charter is justified under section 1.148 Though the
language of section 1 may have suggested the need for some kind of
justification test, the Oakes approach closely tracks the formalist
approach taken by the United States Supreme Court. It contains parts
and sub-parts, each of which allows for a good deal of judicial discretion,
but whose overall effect is to constrain future courts' "approach to the
issue of justification under section 1, rather than to encourage creative
or innovative interpretations of it49 Such an approach, to be sure, does
provide a measure of guidance to litigants and courts. However, the
balancing of the guidance role with the other functions of judicial
reasons may ultimately require a broader debate over the meaning of the
justification clause.15 0 Oakes largely forecloses that debate.
Formalism and the creation of multi-factor tests is also apparent
in the Court's early section 2(b) cases. For example, in Irwin Toy v.
Quebec (Attorney General),151 the Court set out a number of tests to
determine whether government action violated section 2(b).152 For
activity to be considered expression, it must "convey or attempt to
convey a meaning." If the government aims to restrict a form of
expression, such as leafleting, its purpose will be considered to be the
infringement of section 2(b), but efforts to control only the "physical
consequences of certain human activity," such as littering, will not be
treated as having the purpose of infringing section 2(b). Nonetheless,
government action may still be found to infringe section 2(b) if its effect
is to restrict expression-provided that the plaintiff show the expression
in question sought to "convey a meaning reflective of the principles
14 8RP v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
149 See E.P. Mendes, "The Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. Judicial Deference
in the Context of Section 1" in G.A. Beaudoin & E. Mendes, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 3-1 (discussing the Court's turn to formal tests in
interpreting s. 1, and its eventual partial turn away from that approach).
150 See also L.E. Trakman, W. C. Hamilton, & S. Gatien, "R. v. Oakes 1986-1997: Back to the
Drawing Board" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall LJ. 83 at 86. (The Supreme Court's approach to section 1
following Oakes eschewed normative analysis and focused on applying a test that was
"methodological in design and technical in application").
151 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafterlnvin Toy].
152 ibid. at 969-76.
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underlying freedom of expression," as the Court had earlier set out in
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General).153
For some time, the Court continued to employ the section 1 and
section 2(b) architecture set out in Oakes and Irwin Toy respectively, at
least through such cases as R. v. Keegstra, R. v. Butler and R. v.
Zundel.154 However, the Court more recently has shown some desire to
soften the formalistic approach to Charter interpretation that was
evident in the earlier cases. Thus, in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting
Corp.155 the Court was able to use the common law context of the case to
avoid the straitjacket of its earlier tests. It concluded that common law
rules conferring discretion with respect to publication bans must operate
in a manner consistent with Charter values. It engaged in a broad-based
discussion of these values, without following precisely the road map laid
down in the earlier cases. Moreover, despite the fact that the Court did
not directly apply the Oakes test in Dagenais, it nevertheless took the
opportunity to tinker with it, modifying the third part of the
proportionality test to allow more judicial discretion to balance the
deleterious and salutary effects of a government measure that restricts
expression. 156
Similarly, in RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General),157
though Justice McLachlin's plurality opinion supported and applied the
section 1 jurisprudence founded on the Oakes test, she agreed that "an
overtechnical approach to section 1 is to be eschewed ... "15s8 Similarly,
in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15159 and Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General),160 the Court,
unanimously in both cases, repeated that "an approach involving a
'formalistic test' uniformly applicably in all circumstances must be
eschewed." 161
153 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at 764,765 [hereinafter Ford].
154 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter Keegstra]; R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R 452
[hereinafter Butler]; and R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 [hereinafter ZundelJ.
155 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 [hereinafter Dagenais].
156 Ibid. at 889.
157 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter RIR-MacDonald].
158 Ibid. at 328 (per McLachlin J.); see also ibid. at 269-72 (per La Forest J., L'Heureux-Dub
and Gonthier JJ. dissenting).
159 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [hereinafter Ross].
160 [199613 S.C.R. 480 [hereinafter CBC].
161 Ross, supra note 159 at 872.
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Thus, the Court has begun to exhibit a tendency to pull back
from laying down a rigid set of formal rules to constrain the Court's
approach to Charter adjudication. It has begun to favour instead a more
contextual, less rule-bound approach to section 1; similarly, its approach
to section 2(b) has also shown a decreased desire to fit its later decisions
into an analysis as structured and formalistic as that suggested by the
Irwin Toy test. In this limited sense, it might be said that the Court has
shifted away from the quasi-statutory or "multi-part test" approach to
constitutional opinion writing in these areas. Instead, it has adopted a
more minimalist approach. At the same time, the Court is stuck with a
thicket of section 1 jurisprudence, and cannot simply abandon it without
evincing disrespect for its own precedents. Accordingly, the Court's
recent statements about section I in the freedom of expression cases
suggest a simultaneous awkward commitment to and shrinking away
from the Oakes test and its progeny.16 2
This situation aptly demonstrates the dilemma that is raised by a
non-minimalist court, interpreting a relatively new bill of rights, that lays
down broadly applicable rules too quickly. If the Court is serious about
preferring a more contextual approach to section 1, it faces four choices:
it could explicitly abandon the Oakes test and its line of subsequent
cases, which would show little respect for precedent and make the Court
look unprincipled. It could simply ignore Oakes and its progeny, which
would show equally little respect for precedent, and again make the
Court vulnerable to charges that it is unprincipled. It could purport to
follow the test, while quietly eviscerating it, which raises similar
problems and would call for a good deal of obviously contorted
reasoning. Or it could remain loyal to the Oakes test, knowing it has
shortcomings, which would leave the Court trapped in the black-letter
box into which it has placed itself.163
Of course, the truth is more subtle than this analysis suggests.
The Court is not ready to abandon the Oakes test, which in any event is
not so far from the language of section 1 itself, and which allows the
Court a fair amount of discretion. Yet the Court's recent judgments
nevertheless suggest at least some of its members regret that such a
broad test was laid down so early. The Court may continue to rework
Oakes, while still pledging allegiance to it. That situation may eventually
162 See Lasser, supra note 5, for an interesting analysis of this phenomenon in American and
French jurisprudence.
163 For other discussions of the problems of precedent see, for example, M.C. Dorf, "Dicta
and Article III" (1994) 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997; F.H. Easterbrook, "Stability and Reliability in
Judicial Decisions" (1988) 73 Cornell L. Rev. 422.
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become untenable. In short, the cases in this area offer an example of
the potential perils of non-minimalism, and the corresponding virtue of
avoiding the swift promulgation of rules and tests.164 Sometimes laying
down a vague standard rather than a clear rule can be "the better part of
valor; the premature adoption of a rule may prevent the courts from
obtaining the information they need to make a sound rule." 165
The Court has thus in some respects come closer to a sort of
minimalism in its approach to constitutional decision-making, but it
cannot yet be said that its jurisprudence truly fits the model of open-
textured minimalism I have proposed above. As I have suggested, other
qualities characterize open-textured minimalism besides the simple
reluctance to promulgate doctrine too quickly. Qualities such as brevity,
persuasiveness, an awareness of the audience beyond legal professionals,
a consciousness of the inter-generational aspect of the Court's work, a
desire to spark constitutional dialogue, and the use of richly
epigrammatic language are also part of the style of open-textured
minimalism. In the area of freedom of expression, these qualities
epitomize opinions such as Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United
States1 66 or Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. California,167 but with
few exceptions, the Canadian Supreme Court's writing on section 2(b)
cannot match those decisions for concision, persuasive style, or the
ability to provoke deep thought or dialogue.
Certainly some strong language may be found within the Court's
opinions. Thus, Irwin Toy reminds us that freedom of expression is
fundamental "because in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we
prize a diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to
the community and to the individual." 168 Justice La Forest's language in
164 See Fallon, supra note 69 at 113-14. Fried, supra note 37 at 1152, remarks: "The Court
should be like a careful, sober, and reliable trustee of someone else's assets. Imagine how such a
person goes about some project. She is unlikely to conceive every detail and ramification at the first
moment of action. Our important undertakings have a life-cycle. And so, too, there are the rhythms
and sequences by which doctrine ... is brought into being, elaborated, modified, and perhaps
eventually abandoned."
165 The Federal Courts, supra note 98 at 245 [emphasis added]. Posner includes in the former
category, however, "a multifactored test with equal weighting of each factor": ibid It is difficult to
slot the Oakes test into either category. As a multi-factor test in which each sub-test is itself a vague
rule, but all prongs of the test must be met rather than simply being weighed in the balance, it is
neither fish nor fowl. In any event, the experience with Oakes suggests that even this degree of
definitiveness in a rule may become problematic for future courts.
166 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919).
1 6 7 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927) [hereinafter Whitney].
168 Supra note 151 at 968.
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Ross emphasizing the "importance of ensuring an equal and
discrimination free educational environment, and the perception of
fairness and tolerance in the classroom"169 is an equally strongly worded
reminder of the potential merit of arguments favouring the restriction of
some expression. Justice Cory's discussion of freedom of expression in
Edmonton Journal still resonates with its readers, and continues to
influence the course taken by the Court:
It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democratic society than
freedom of expression. Indeed a democracy cannot exist without that freedom to express
new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions. The
concept of free and uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic societies and
institutions. The vital importance of the concept cannot be over-emphasized. ... It seems
that the rights enshrined in s. 2(b) should therefore only be restricted in the clearest of
circumstances. 170
Other examples of strong writing may be found within the
Court's freedom of expression jurisprudence. Nevertheless, I think it fair
to say they are more the exception than the rule. The length of the
Court's opinions in the early to mid-1990s is evident in this area. For
example, the main opinions in each of Keegstra, Zundel, and RJR-
MacDonald take up more than 100 bilingual pages of the Supreme Court
Reports.1 71
Much of the length of these opinions is taken up by the kind of
material criticized by Wigmore-lengthy recitations of the facts,
including many inessential matters; extensive string citations of earlier
cases; and extended discussions of and quotations from cases that have
little bearing on the issues at stake in the instant case;172 and discussions
169 Supra note 159 at 874.
170 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General) [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at 1336 [hereinafter
Edmonton Journal].
171 But see L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 35 at 587: "[I]t will take time before we come to grips
with our new constitutional document, and until we do, the preferable approach is to allow all views
to be expressed, thereby hampering as little as possible our freedom to later expand or correct the
courses we have chosen." This view accords with my own argument that the Charter's youthful status
should influence the way in which the Court writes opinions involving the Charter. However, my
arguments suggest that the style and methodology of judicial opinions can hamper future courts
regardless of the plurality of those opinions.
172 See L'Heureux-Dub6, ibid. at 585: "When a particular case presents the Court with an
opportunity to give definite direction on a particular point of law, the natural inclination is to
explore each facet of the particular legal problem, recount history and account for each theory or
precedent." On a more critical note, see C.A. Beardsley, "An Unconventional After-Dinner
Speech" (1941) 25 J. Am. Jud. Soe'y 40 at 41: "But the judges don't stop when they run out of their
own words. They cause their typists to copy paragraph after paragraph, and sometimes page after
page, of other judges' words ...."
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of the central issues that exhibit a tendency to wander, rather than
bearing down on the key arguments to be made.
Thus, even where there is strong writing to be found on freedom
of expression within the Court's jurisprudence, it may be obscured, and
its impact lessened, by the length and nature of the writing that
surrounds it. Moreover, most of the writing in these opinions is not
stylistically strong, whether according to general impressions of style or
according to the more specific criteria identified as hallmarks of an
open-textured minimalist style. More often, the Court's style is aptly
captured by some of the critical language in Posner's description of the
"pure" style of opinion writing: it tends to employ more legalistic
language than is strictly necessary, it is often solemnly formal, it is long
for what it has to say, its tone is artifactual and impersonal.17 3 Its
opinions seem to have been written solely for the community of regular
readers of judicial opinions, with perhaps less effort made to be broadly
persuasive than would be the case if the Court wrote in the belief that it
should reach a larger audience.
Even the best writing of the Court on freedom of expression,
such as that noted above, shows little of the epigrammatic, aphoristic,
richly evocative character that is present in the work of a prose artist
such as Holmes, or the best work of Cardozo. Even resonant words such
as those of Justice Cory in Edmonton Journal, in my view the most
eloquent language of the Supreme Court on section 2(b), are more
hortatory than provocative, more of a Sunday-sermon declamation
about our constitutional values than an effort to persuade us that his
statement is true or important, and certainly not an invitation to disagree
with or supplement the values he describes. His words undoubtedly
command one's respect, but they are less successful at commanding
one's attention or assent, especially when compared to a more open-
textured, arresting but obscure phrase. "Men feared witches and burnt
women," Brandeis wrote.1 74 It is not as easily intelligible as Justice
Cory's clear statement of the importance of expression in a free
society-yet, at the same time, it is instantly intelligible, unmistakable in
its force and implications. It has a swift and powerful impact on its
reader, but it also has the capacity to provoke years of discussion about
its full meaning. The Whitney concurrence still provokes productive and
173 See "Judges' writing Styles," supra note 9 at 1426-29.
174 Whitney, supra note 167 at 376 (Brandeis J. concurring).
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varied discussion about the meaning of free speech 70 years later;175
years after more direct, but less captivating exhortations, like Justice
Cory's statement in Edmonton Journal, will have likely lost most of their
power to move the reader.
In short, despite the potential for eloquent, stirring or
provocative discussion that is inherent in the subject of freedom of
expression, the Supreme Court rarely attains the influence or eloquence
of opinion such as the Whitney concurrence. Though it has shown a
greater tendency of late to avoid promulgating as many rules and tests as
it once did, the structure and style of its opinions suggest that it displays
few of the traits that make up the style of open-textured minimalism.
Such criticisms cannot be shrugged off by dismissing opinions such as the
Whitney concurrence as mere rhetoric. Rhetorically effective opinions
command attention and provoke thought and discussion. They move
those they convince to do their utmost to defend the values extolled in
the opinion, and stir those they cannot convince to craft the best possible
arguments in response. They rise above more mundane language to
affect readers, both in the legal community and beyond, long after other
opinions have been forgotten, and they may serve as a wellspring for
years of healthy democratic dialogue about the nature and extent of our
constitutional values. There is something to be said for the proposition
that the Court, when writing about the Charter, should say less, but say it
better.
Despite the critical note I have sounded in this article, I hasten
to add that I do not mean to suggest that the Court has never used
open-textured minimalism in its writings. The opinion of the Court in
the Secession Reference176 is an excellent example of the mixture of
judicial prudentialism and stylistic care that characterizes the
open-textured minimalist approach outlined in this article.
Several features of the Court's opinion are worth noting. First is
its size. It is not short, to be sure; but, given the weight of the issues
raised and the space that could have been expended, it is surprisingly
brief. Thus, after a substantial discussion of the core constitutional
principles that undergird the opinion, the Court dispenses with the
question of the constitutionality of a unilateral declaration of
175 Compare V. Blasi, "The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California" (1988) 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 653 (discussing the opinion
approvingly), with C.A. MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) at
104 (subjecting Brandeis's aphorism, quoted above, to searching criticism).
176 Secession Reference, supra note 96.
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independence in a mere 25 paragraphs. 177 Its discussion of the effect of
the international law of secession takes only a little more discussion: 37
paragraphs.1 78 This compression is achieved without any real loss of
clarity, and is possible because of the Court's evident determination to
bear down directly on the issues it chose to address.
Second, consider the use of language. In keeping with its
awareness that the Secession Reference concerned issues of broad
political significance, the Court avoided a narrowly legalistic tone and
adopted plain language that often lent a highly practical air to the
constitutional discussion. The opinion was clearly the product of an
effort to speak in a lasting and memorable way to a broader audience.
To that end, the opinion is heavily laced with precisely the sort of tropes
identified above as classic tools of effective judicial rhetoric. Thus, the
aphoristic ring of this sentence, which relies heavily on alliteration: "In
our constitutional tradition, legality and legitimacy are linked." 179 Or the
remark, capped by a blunt colloquialism, that "it would be naive to
expect that the substantive goal of secession could readily be
distinguished from the practical details of secession. The devil would be
in the details."180 Metaphor, too, is highly evident in the opinion, as in
the Court's effort to emphasize the interwoven nature of Confederation:
"Nobody seriously suggests that our national existence, seamless in so
many aspects, could be effortlessly separated along what are now the
provincial boundaries of Quebec. As the Attorney General of
Saskatchewan put it in his oral submission: "... The threads of a
thousand acts of accommodation are the fabric of a nation. .. ."181
A final element of this opinion that identifies it with the
open-textured minimalist approach is what it does not decide. Despite
the obviously broad scope of its discussion of the "vital unstated" 182
constitutional principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and
the rule of law, and respect for minority rights, the Court's actual
application of these principles to the questions presented in the
government's reference was narrowly drawn and left much to be
discussed by other parties, including voters, legislatures, government
negotiators, and future courts. Thus, the Court declined to address what
177 ibid. at 263-75.
178 Ibid. at 276-91.
179 Ibid. at 240.
180 Ibid. at 267.
181 Ibid. at 269-70.
182 Ibid. at 247.
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would happen if properly conducted separation negotiations reach an
impasse,18 3 and removed itself from any "supervisory role over the
political aspects of constitutional negotiations," 18 4 noting that the
constitutional principles enunciated by the Court will sometimes fall to
the political process, not the judicial process, for protection.185
In short, despite its entry into the vexing political and legal issues
surrounding secession, the Supreme Court's relatively minimalist
opinion lets these issues remain part of an ongoing democratic and
inter-generational discussion among Canadians. At the same time, it
articulated general constitutional principles that will serve as organizing
principles for ongoing discussions about secession and, more generally,
as the starting point for broader discussion about Canadian
constitutional values.
VI. CAVEATS AND FUTURE QUESTIONS
This article has advocated a particular approach to judicial
opinion writing in Canadian constitutional law-open-textured
minimalism-that would encourage judges to craft deep, but narrow,
opinions that provoke democratic and inter-generational discussions
about our constitutional values, while resisting the urge to lay down too
much doctrine at once. This approach is respectful of the presence of
widespread disagreement about the precise implications of our
constitutional values-a state of affairs that is altogether appropriate in
a heterogeneous, democratic culture with a youthful constitution. Open-
textured minimalist courts respond to this condition by seeking to
resolve only as much as necessary at a given time, while encouraging
other individuals and institutions to continue their public dialogue about
our constitutional values-and contributing to that debate themselves.
This approach is particularly important in the early years of our Charter
and of the Constitution Act, 1982 as a whole, when we may be tempted to
settle as many issues as possible for future generations of constitutional
interpreters, despite our own relative lack of experience and wisdom on
these issues.
183 Ibid. at 270.
184 Ibid at 271.
185 Ibid. at 271-72.
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Open-textured minimalism doubtless sacrifices some of the
judicial opinion's ability to offer one of the essential functions of the
judicial opinion: guidance. However, given the relative youth of the
Constitution Act, 1982, the special legitimacy concerns that are raised by
sweeping constitutional opinions, and the high costs of error in this area,
the loss of guidance may be outweighed by other benefits: namely, the
open-textured minimalist opinion's ability to enrich democratic
deliberation about our constitutional values, while minimizing the effect
of erroneous constitutional decisions by the courts.
Given the sweeping nature of this proposed approach to opinion-
writing style, it may be appropriate to conclude with some cautionary
remarks. First, like any style, open-textured minimalism should be
treated as a general approach and not a rigid rule. It would be ironic
indeed if an article counselling against too eager a promulgation of
binding rules should itself seek to become a rule of style binding on
appellate judges in all constitutional cases. A good artist learns to work
within the rules of his or her chosen medium. A great artist comes to
understand when to break these rules. So it is with style in the writing of
judicial opinions.' 86 While open-textured minimalism is an approach
well-suited to the role and function of constitutional opinions, even
judges who whole-heartedly adopt such a style must sometimes abandon
it. The factual or legal questions involved in some constitutional issue
may become sufficiently clear over time that it becomes appropriate to
settle the issue in a definitive way.187 Alternatively, an issue may be a
source of such ongoing controversy that it becomes desirable to come
down on one side of the issue or the other through a clear legal rule,
which may always be reversed if public consensus shifts decisively against
it.188 Similarly, the desire to be concise and persuasive should not be
pursued at any cost; if an opinion is brilliantly stated but dishonest or
elliptical, its style may come at too high a cost.189 How a judge ought to
balance these competing needs in a given case is, not surprisingly, a
question of judgment.
Just the same, if style is rarely the dominant concern of a judge
writing a constitutional law opinion, it ought always to be one of his or
her foremost concerns. Style does matter. The Charter was written to last
186 See Posner, supra note 2 at 297.
187 See, for example, J.D. Wexler, "Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as
Judicial Minimalism" (1998) 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 298 at 305.
188 See also One Case, supra note 16 at c. 4.
189 See, for example, The Federal Courts, supra note 98 at 351.
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a long time, and its language was meant to resonate for generations. We
should expect as much from the language of those charged with
interpreting it.
